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Abstract
The Prisoner’s Dilemma has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding the
ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit. A strictly dominant strategy in a
Prisoner’s Dilemma (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful. Repetition of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma can give rise to cooperation as an equilibrium, but defection is as well, and this ambiguity is
difficult to resolve. The numerous behavioral experiments investigating the Prisoner’s Dilemma highlight that
players often cooperate, but the level of cooperation varies significantly with the specifics of the experimental
predicament. We present the first computational model of human behavior in repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games that unifies the diversity of experimental observations in a systematic and quantitatively reliable
manner. Our model relies on data we integrated from many experiments, comprising 168,386 individual
decisions. The computational model is composed of two pieces: the first predicts the first-period action
using solely the structural game parameters, while the second predicts dynamic actions using both game
parameters and history of play. Our model is extremely successful not merely at fitting the data, but in
predicting behavior at multiple scales in experimental designs not used for calibration, using only information
about the game structure. We demonstrate the power of our approach through a simulation analysis revealing
how to best promote human cooperation.
Keywords: Social dilemma; Prisoner’s Dilemma; Repeated games; Predictive modeling; Computer simulation;
Institutional design
Introduction
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has been a subject of extensive research due to its importance in understanding
the ever-present tension between individual self-interest and social benefit [1–3]. From a theoretical perspective,
a strictly dominant strategy (defection), when played by both players, is mutually harmful: cooperation
by both yields significant mutual benefits relative to defection. For example, local maintenance of shared
drinking water systems in rural communities represents a Prisoner’s Dilemma that can result in a “tragedy of
the commons” [4]. From each community member’s perspective, they are better off if someone else invests in
maintaining the infrastructure. If the majority of the community adopts this strategy, everyone is worse off
because the system breaks down and no longer provides clean water.
In most social dilemma settings, however, interactions are repeated. Thus, for example, community members
must repeatedly make water infrastructure investment decisions. Repetition of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a
more realistic model of human interaction than a one-shot game, can theoretically give rise to cooperation
as an equilibrium if players are sufficiently patient; still, defection remains an equilibrium as well, and this
ambiguity is difficult to resolve. In particular, theoretical treatment of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma games is
not instructive in identifying when cooperation or defection emerges as the predominant outcome. Given the
limitations of theory in explaining repeated cooperation, researchers have turned to experiments to better
understand behavior and the effects of institutional structure on social outcome by considering different
game structures and investigating associated cooperation proclivities of human subjects [5]. The experiments
highlight that humans often cooperate, but the overall level and temporal evolution of cooperation vary
significantly with the specific design.
1See http://johnjnay.com/ for author contact details.
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We develop a predictive model of dynamic cooperation that reliably forecasts behavior across heterogeneous
game designs, and then analyze this model to tease apart the magnitude and direction of the effects of
game design variables on cooperation. For this purpose we compiled data from previously analyzed repeated
Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments [6–13]. We created standardized measures of the game and individual
behavior across these games, and used machine learning techniques to calibrate and evaluate computational
models. Our model is extremely successful in predicting individual decisions, average cooperation levels, and
cooperation dynamics in games not used for model calibration. Moreover, we demonstrate that this synthetic
model can predict the high-level quantitative and qualitative findings of the human subject experiments.
The long-term goal of this research program is to map the experimental variables onto real-world policy
design factors and use model analyses to inform policies that facilitate cooperation where the underlying
social structure would otherwise lead to a breakdown. For instance, how can we best design development
programs that lead to sufficient voluntary maintenance of shared water systems? Is it more important to
increase the potential benefits of mutual cooperation over mutual defection, or to increase the benefits of
mutual cooperation over losing out by being the sole cooperator?
Data
The data are from human subjects experiments that used real financial incentives and transparently conveyed
the rules of the game to the subjects, which is standard procedure in experimental economics. Subjects
anonymously interact and their decisions to cooperate or defect at each time period of each interaction are
recorded. They receive payoffs proportional to the outcomes in a specified payoff table similar to Table 1.
From the description of the experiments in the published papers and the publicly available data sets, we were
able to build a comprehensive collection of game structures and individual decisions.
The thirty game structures that we compiled varied substantially across a number of dimensions, aside from
player payoffs. In some structures, payoffs were deterministic, whereas others featured stochastic payoffs
(in this case, the expected payoffs constituted the payoff structure). In some structures, players imperfectly
observed their counterparts’ past actions. Another key distinction was whether or not a game had a fixed
time horizon, or would terminate independently after each iteration with a fixed probability. Finally, while
most games were played over a discrete sequence of iterations, some were in continuous time. We use nine
variables to quantify game structure along these salient dimensions. Risk is an indicator of whether there is
stochasticity in the payoffs [8,10]. Error is the probability that the choice a player makes will be exogenously
flipped [13]. Infinite is an indicator of whether interactions are indefinitely repeated or have a fixed length [7].
δ is the probability that the next period of the current paired interaction will occur in a infinitely game [11].
We used a formula, E[InteractionLength] = 11−δ , to compute δ for finitely repeated interactions; for instance,
the finitely repeated interactions in [10] were all ten periods long so δ = 0.9. Continuous is an indicator of
whether interactions are played in “continuous time,” rather than the standard discrete rounds [12]. R is the
reward received if both players cooperate; P is the punishment received if both defect; T is the temptation
to defect on the other; and S is the payoff for being a sucker by cooperating as the other defects (Table 1
illustrates the way in which the four payoff values map onto the Prisoner’s Dilemma bi-matrix representation).
C D
C (R,R) (S,T)
D (T,S) (P,P)
Table 1. Payoff table where one player plays from the perspective of the columns and the other from the
rows. For this to be a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, it must hold that T > R > P > S, and R > (S + T )/2
[14].
To create standardized payoff measures from the R, S, T, P values, we used two differences between payoffs
associated with important game outcomes, both normalized by the difference between the temptation to
defect and being a sucker when cooperating as the other defects [15]. r1 is the normalized difference between
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the reward received if both players cooperate and the punishment received if both defect, R−PT−S . r2 is the
normalized difference between the reward received if both players cooperate and the payoff for being a sucker
when cooperating as the other defects, R−ST−S . Because
∂r1
∂R > 0,
∂r1
∂P < 0,
∂r1
∂T < 0, and
∂r1
∂S > 0, r1 has been
used as an index of the cooperativeness of a Prisoner’s Dilemma [15,16], while r2 is descriptive of how much
better off a player will be if their opponent cooperates, rather than defects, while they themselves cooperate.
Table 2 summarizes the game structures from the data sets we standardized and combined.
Error Delta Infinity Continuous Risk r1 r2 Cooperation Dataset
0.0000 0.900 0 0 0 0.18 0.590 0.60 BR
0.0000 0.900 0 0 1 0.18 0.590 0.35 BR
0.0000 0.900 1 0 0 0.33 0.670 0.56 DO
0.0000 0.900 0 0 1 0.33 0.830 0.31 KS
0.0000 0.900 0 0 0 0.33 0.830 0.57 KS
0.0000 0.500 1 0 0 0.18 0.530 0.10 DF
0.0000 0.750 1 0 0 0.18 0.530 0.20 DF
0.0000 0.500 1 0 0 0.39 0.740 0.18 DF
0.0000 0.750 1 0 0 0.39 0.740 0.59 DF
0.0000 0.750 1 0 0 0.61 0.950 0.76 DF
0.0000 0.500 1 0 0 0.61 0.950 0.35 DF
0.1250 0.875 1 0 0 0.20 0.600 0.34 FR
0.1250 0.875 1 0 0 0.33 0.660 0.49 FR
0.1250 0.875 1 0 0 0.43 0.710 0.59 FR
0.0000 0.875 1 0 0 0.60 0.800 0.74 FR
0.0625 0.875 1 0 0 0.60 0.800 0.78 FR
0.1250 0.875 1 0 0 0.60 0.800 0.57 FR
0.0000 0.900 0 0 0 0.25 0.583 0.43 AM
0.0000 0.875 0 1 0 0.11 0.560 0.27 FO
0.0000 0.875 0 1 0 0.14 0.710 0.33 FO
0.0000 0.875 0 1 0 0.33 0.560 0.54 FO
0.0000 0.875 0 1 0 0.43 0.710 0.62 FO
0.0000 0.500 0 0 0 0.33 0.610 0.12 DB
0.0000 0.750 0 0 0 0.33 0.610 0.24 DB
0.0000 0.750 0 0 0 0.33 0.720 0.25 DB
0.0000 0.500 0 0 0 0.33 0.720 0.13 DB
0.0000 0.500 1 0 0 0.33 0.610 0.23 DB
0.0000 0.750 1 0 0 0.33 0.610 0.35 DB
0.0000 0.750 1 0 0 0.33 0.720 0.36 DB
0.0000 0.500 1 0 0 0.33 0.720 0.31 DB
Table 2. Summary of thirty game structures that compose the full combined data set [6–13]. BR 2006 [8]
and DB 2005 [7] both also conducted one-shot games; we only describe and use their repeated game data.
KSBS 2009 [10] also conducted games with partial information; we only describe and use their full information
data. AM 1993 [6] also conducted games that matched humans with computers; we only describe and use
the games they conducted where humans played other humans. FO 2012 [12] included one-shot games and
games with very different protocols for how and when to make a choice in order to study continuous choices;
we only use the “Grid treatment with n = 8 subperiods,” which they say is, “comparable to the 10-stage
repeated games featured in previous laboratory studies.” DO 2009 [9] also conducted random matching of
opponents; we only use their fixed matching treatments.
Fig. 1 plots game structures based on their values of the four quantitative game structure variables, r1, r2, δ,
and error, illustrating the broad empirical support in our combined data across the values of these variables,
and that there are no simple relationships between these variables and the proportion of cooperation that
can be detected without, at least, controlling for variables not included in each plot.
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Fig. 1. Game structures (n = 30 ) with location based on the payoff variable values (A.), and delta and
error values (B.). Colors represent proportion of cooperation observed in the game structure. Locations have
been slightly randomly shifted to improve visualization.
Our combined data set can be organized hierarchically (Fig. 2). Within each game structure, there are
interactions between pairs of players; these are repetitions of the same “stage-game” between the same two
players. Repeating the game with past behavior as common knowledge can theoretically increase cooperation
by bringing players’ reputational concerns into play. Within each interaction, there are time periods. Finally,
in each time period, both players simultaneously take a single action.
...
... ...
... ... ... ...
Structure1 Structure30
Interaction1 InteractionI Interaction1 InteractionI
Time1 TimeT Time1 TimeT Time1 TimeT Time1 TimeT
C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2 C1 C2
Action1 Action168386
Fig. 2. A hierarchical view of our data. The top level divides the data into 30 game structures. The next
level down are the interactions between two players. Within each interaction, there are T time periods. In
repeated games in which termination is stochastic, T ranges up to thirty-eight. Across all interactions and
structures, T is five, on average. Within each time period, player 1 takes action C1 and player 2 takes action
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C2. 168,386 actions were taken across all the experimental data.
Our goal was to predict behavioral patterns simultaneously at several levels within this hierarchy. Specifically,
we wish to predict the effects of the game structure on average cooperation (the highest level in the hierarchy),
the temporal dynamics of cooperation as a function of structure (second lowest level), and individual-level
actions (lowest level). The impact of structure on cooperation has been the primary subject of experimental
investigations, with the natural goal of understanding how to design institutions that promote cooperation.
Understanding both short-term and long-term impacts of institutions, however, necessitates looking at
behavior dynamics, rather than simply aggregate levels of cooperation. Indeed, cooperation may well be high
early, but degrade with time, particularly close to the final period of the game, if it is known [8]. Finally,
understanding individual behavior enables us to understand aggregate cooperation dynamics in terms of
micro decision processes. If our computational model can successfully predict behavior at all levels in the
hierarchy, we can have confidence in the ability of the resulting model to generalize experimental findings to
new institutional structures, allowing us to achieve the ultimate goal: a validated computational framework
for designing institutions that promote cooperation.
Model
Our behavioral model has two parts: a “static” component that predicts a player’s first period action, and
a “dynamic” component that predicts a player’s actions in subsequent times of the same interaction. Both
components are logistic regressions mapping a vector of predictor variables into the probability of cooperation,
with parameters learned through maximum likelihood estimation on training data. The predictor variables
for first period play include the game structure, ~Game, (r1, r2, risk, error, δ, infinite, continuous), and the
predictors for all other time periods (i.e., the dynamic model) include the game structure, the actions of both
players from the previous period, ~Historyt−1, and the current time period, t. The inclusion of the history of
the interaction is motivated by evidence that most participants in repeated cooperation games condition
their actions on previous play [17]. In mathematical terms, the probability of cooperation, p(Ct), can be
expressed as follows:
p(Ct) =
{
t = 1 fstatic( ~Game)
t > 1 fdynamic( ~Game, ~Historyt−1, t)
where f is determined by the logistic regression model (distinct in both cases), calibrated on behavioral data.
Specifically, we used the following equation for first period cooperation, Ct=1:
r1 + r2 + risk + error + δ + r1 × δ + r2 × δ + infinity + continuous
We used the following equation for cooperation in periods greater than one, Ct>1:
r1 + r2 + risk + error + δ + r1 × δ + r2 × δ + infinity + continuous+ δ × infinity+
my.decisiont−1 + other.decisiont−1 + error × other.decisiont−1 + t
Both equations use all the structural game features, r1 + r2 + risk + error + δ + r1 × δ + r2 × δ + infinity +
continuous, and because we hypothesized that δ and the payoff variables may have difference effects depending
on the values of the other, we interacted them. For the dynamic model, we added an interaction term between
δ and infinity to capture the different effect that δ may have when it actually determines the length of the
game probabilistically. In finite games, δ represents a rational expectation of the length of the game from
a first period perspective. In infinite games, δ represents a rational expectation of the length of the game
for all periods. Therefore, δ is used as a feature in the model of first period play, and for all periods of play
beyond period one there is an interaction term that multiplies the indicator variable for whether a game is
infinite by the value of δ. We interacted error with other.decisiont−1 because the greater the value of error,
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the less sure the player is of the actual decision of the other player in the previous time period. The model is
then a logistic sigmoid function, σ(wTX) = 11+exp(−wTX) , acting on a linear function of these features, X,
with a vector of weights, ~w, the length of the feature set. The computational implementation we used was
the base R “stats::glm” function and the caret “train” function [18,19].
We compare our model’s performance to three alternative logistic regression models: “static-only,” which
just uses the first component of the “full” model; “dynamic-only,” which just uses the second component;
and “baseline,” which uses the observed average level of cooperation. Comparing the full model to its
components allows us to understand the relative contributions of the components to its predictive power. We
also compare our model to a state-of-the-art behavioral game theory model designed for forecasting play in
out-of-sample games: functional experience-weighted attraction learning (fEWA) [20]. The actions available
to agent i, which are indexed by j, are assumed to have numerical attractions for each time t, Aji (t), and
fEWA updates the attractions based on functions of i’s experience up to time t and the payoffs of the game
(i’s chosen strategy is si(t), i’s opponent’s chosen strategy is s−i(t), i’s payoffs are pii(sji (t), s−i(t)), and I
yields I(x, y) = 0 if x 6= y, and I(x, y) = 1 if x = y).
Aji (t) =
φi(t)N(t− 1)Aji (t− 1) + [δij(t) + (1− δij(t))I(sji , si(t))]pii(sji , s−i(t))
N(t− 1)φi(t) + 1
Then, attractions are mapped into probabilities of choosing Cooperate or Defect the next time period with a
logistic stochastic response function (see S1 Appendix for model details).
P ji (t+ 1) =
eλA
j
i
(t)∑mi
k=1 e
λAk
i
(t)
In order to use the empirical models of individual behavior to predict interactive outcomes of new experimental
designs, we simulate discrete-time dynamic systems comprised of autonomous decision algorithms (agents)
that interact with each other. This allows us to simulate the play of an experiment without any behavioral
data from that experiment. Player behavior is endogenous to the simulation model, which only needs to
be initialized with a game structure specification. There have been a number of studies using simulations
to investigate cooperation games [21–27], and simulations have been used to inform institutional design
of strategic interactions more broadly [28–30]. There has been research on cooperative equilibria models
for predicting aggregate cooperation patterns [31,32], and a significant amount of work on individual-level
behavioral models [33–40]. Our work diverges from most such research in three respects: (i) agent behavior
is derived solely from individual-level empirical data, and (ii) we rigorously validate our model’s ability to
predict behavior by measuring performance on many unseen game structures. [27] also derive agent behavior
solely from individual-level game data. However, we utilize data from many more experimental designs and
from a different game.
Results
Individual-level performance
Our first investigation evaluates models’ ability to predict individual-level actions. We divide game structures
into training and test groups, estimate the parameters in training game structures, and then predict actions
in held-out game structures, conditioning on the game structure and the empirically observed actions of the
previous period (for periods greater than one). We repeatedly execute the process, each time slightly changing
the split of the data so each game structure will be in the test data once (Fig. 3). The end results are
out-of-sample predictions of all actions in each game structure. To make predictions with the dynamic-only
model, which will have missing values for the lagged action outcomes at period one, we draw cooperate/defect
actions with equal probability (corresponding, approximately, to average cooperation/defection split over all
game structures). When we instead impute “period zero” outcomes as mutual cooperation the results are
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qualitatively the same. For this test, we measure the log-likelihood of the observed actions in the test data,
given model predictions, which is a statistically proper method for evaluating the quality of probabilistic
predictions. We also discretize model outputs into Cooperate or Defect to measure accuracy, which is the
proportion of actions where the predicted probability of cooperation was above (below) 0.5 when the observed
action was cooperation (defection).
Split Data
Test Games Training Games
Calibrate
Individual−level
Model
Individual Actions and
Game Structure
Individual Actions and
Game Structure
Individual Actions
and Game StructurePredict Actions w/Structure and Lagged Actions
Fig. 3. Model validation process for individual-level actions. We assign each of the thirty game structures
into either training or test data. With the training data, we learn the parameters of the individual-level model,
and then predict the decisions in game structures assigned to the test data. We repeat this process thirty
times, including a different game structure as the held-out test each time (leave-out-one-cross-validation),
until we have predictions for all the decisions for each of the game structures.
The dynamic model performs almost as well as the full model in periods greater than one, but poorly in the
first period, indeed, worse than the static model (Table 3). Overall, our relatively simple two-piece model
predicts the next action a player will take with 86% accuracy on average (a remarkably good prediction,
given that human behavior is generally quite noisy). Our model also significantly outperforms all alternatives
in terms of the log-likelihood measure, which is more statistically appropriate in quantifying performance of
stochastic forecasts, but is less intuitive.
Aggregate-level performance
To evaluate the model’s ability to predict behavior in new game structures, we developed the following
procedure (Fig. 4). Assign each of the thirty game structures into either training or test data. With the
training data, learn the parameters of the individual-level model. Next, create a simulation in which the
estimated individual-level model makes joint decisions in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game, and predict
the probabilistic behavior in game structures assigned to the test data using only the game structure, i.e.,
using no behavioral data from the experiment. Finally, compare the predictions, p(ynewsim | ~Game
new
), to actual
observed cooperation dynamics, ynewobs , using both squared error and correlation to measure success of the
model in predicting behavior. Repeat this process thirty times, including a different game structure as the
held-out test each time (leave-out-one-cross-validation), until we have a prediction for each of the game
structures as if each prediction were made before any data had been collected for that experimental design.
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We also test that the results are robust to the number of folds in the cross-validation procedure (from thirty
down to three), i.e. robust to the number of game structures used for training.
Split Data
Test Games Training Games
Embed
in Simulation
Calibrate
Individual−level
Model
Individual Actions and
Game StructureOnly GameStructure
Individual Actions
and Game StructureSimulate Actions w/
only Game Structure
Fig. 4. Model validation process for aggregate-level patterns. We tested the dynamic-only model by sampling
lagged outcomes for ‘period zero’ actions from a Bernoulli distribution with equal probability of cooperation
and defection, which is approximately the mean cooperation rate in the data. A subtle, but crucial, distinction
between this process and the model validation process for individual-level action predictions (Fig. 3) is that,
here, we only pass game structures for the test games, rather than the full behavioral data and the game
stucture.
We compare the performance of the five models’ predictions of average probability of cooperation and
dynamics of cooperation (Table 3). Our model is slightly worse at predicting overall cooperation levels than
the static model, but better at predicting dynamics (neither comparison is significant), and is significantly
better than the other models in almost all cases.
Full Static Dynamic fEWA Baseline
Acc. t=1 68 62 57 48 48
Acc. t>1 86 68 85 62 62
LL t=1 -656 -668 -846 -748 -761
LL t>1 -1624 -2945 -1726 -3108 -3146
Cor-Time 0.755 0.709 0.713 0.241 -0.697
Cor-Avg. 0.774 0.819 0.721 0.106 -0.724
RMSE-Time 0.149 0.154 0.163 0.213 0.224
RMSE-Avg. 0.126 0.113 0.136 0.194 0.203
Table 3. Comparison of model performance. Best performance for each test is italicized. First four rows
are performance on 32,614 predictions of period one actions and 135,772 predictions of period greater than
one actions. Each evaluation is an average for how that model performed with out-of-sample predictions for
each game structure. We conduct paired sample t-tests (not assuming equal variances) to determine if the
thirty accuracy and likelihood values for the full model are statistically greater than the values of the next
best model. Accuracies for t>1 of the full model (p = 0.03 ) and the likelihoods for t>1 of the full model (p
< 0.001 ) are significantly higher than the next best model (dynamic). Accuracies for t=1 of the full model
are greater than the next best model, the static model (p = 0.07 ), while the likelihoods for t=1 of the full
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model are not significantly greater than the likelihoods of the static model (p = 0.31 ). Last four rows are
performance on average cooperation level in each structure (n=30 ) and time series of average cooperation in
each structure (n=212 ). Infinitely repeated interactions with delta set to 0.5 are on average only two periods
long and there is not sufficient empirical data to extend out to eight periods so we extend to seven. Two
structures are finitely repeated for two periods and two others are finitely repeated for four periods. We
conducted paired sample t-tests between the full model and competitors, with a null hypothesis that the true
difference in means of the 212 squared errors between predicted and real cooperation levels at all times in all
game structures is equal to zero, i.e. that the full model and a competitor are statistically indistinguishable
in terms of squared errors on time series predictions. We did the same for the thirty predictions of overall
cooperation levels. We reject the null of no difference for all comparisons except with the static model for
both tests and the dynamic model for the time series (see S1 Appendix).
Estimating the parameters of the model on a subset of the data and then evaluating the performance of the
model on held-out data allows us to measure generalizability. However, randomly dividing the data increases
bias of the evaluation of the predictive performance because the estimated value of the predictive power is
conditional on which data were included in the training or test samples. To reduce this bias, it is common to
run multiple rounds of this process and then average the resulting values of predictive performance [41]. If
we do this n times, this is called leave-out-one-cross-validation (LOOCV), which has lower bias; however,
LOOCV can have higher variance in the estimates compared to k-fold validation, where k < n [42]. Fig. 5
displays the effect of the number of folds in cross-validation on model performance, demonstrating that our
main results are robust to the value of k.
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Fig. 5. RMSE (A.) and correlation (B.) for time series forecasts of play in 30 game structures, varying folds
in cross-validation from 30 to 2. The full model consistently has lower prediction error and higher correlation
than the baseline model and the fEWA model until there are only two folds. It is, in general, difficult to
make accurate predictions when the ratio of observational units to folds is small. In the case of predicting
aggregate and dynamic play, the game structure itself is the observational unit, and we only have thirty, so
it’s not surprising that performance can degrade at two folds depending on the particular random realization
of fold assignments.
Every panel in Fig. 6 is the full model’s out-of-sample forecast for the average probability of cooperation at
each time, conditional only on the game structure of that experiment. Our model’s time series of average
cooperation is statistically significantly positively correlated (0.76, p<0.001 ) with the observed time series.
To better understand Fig. 6, observe, for example, Structure 14: using no data from that game structure, our
model predicted the initial (high) level of cooperation almost exactly and then was perfectly correlated with
the empirically observed mean cooperation level throughout the next seven periods of play. The S1 Appendix
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displays the equivalent of Fig. 6 for all other models, which are noticeably worse at predicting the time series.
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Structure 1: cor = 0.68 Structure 2: cor = 0.74 Structure 3: cor = 0.55 Structure 4: cor = −0.13
Structure 5: cor = 0.94 Structure 6: cor = 0.25 Structure 7: cor = 0.72 Structure 8: cor = −0.1
Structure 9: cor = 0.94 Structure 10: cor = 0.53 Structure 11: cor = 0.96 Structure 12: cor = 0.98
Structure 13: cor = 0.99 Structure 14: cor = 1 Structure 15: cor = 0.84 Structure 16: cor = 0.98
Structure 17: cor = 0.99 Structure 18: cor = 0.86 Structure 19: cor = 0.96 Structure 20: cor = 0.92
Structure 21: cor = 0.82 Structure 22: cor = 0.82 Structure 23: cor = 1 Structure 24: cor = 0.97
Structure 25: cor = 0.97 Structure 26: cor = 1 Structure 27: cor = −0.94 Structure 28: cor = 0.87
Structure 29: cor = 0.82 Structure 30: cor = −0.73
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Fig. 6. Out-of-sample forecasts of cooperation level over time, for all game structures, conditional only on
the game structure (n = 212).
The dynamic-only model performed nearly as well as the full model on individual-level period > 1 actions,
but worse on both tests of aggregate pattern predictions. By investigating the coefficients of the estimated
individual-level dynamic model, we discover that the actions taken by a player and her opponent in the
previous period are highly predictive of the next action (Fig. 7). The variable with the most predictive
power is the player’s own previous action: if a player cooperated (defected) in the previous period, she is very
likely to cooperate (defect) in the next. There is strong inertia to Prisoner Dilemma behavior, and, therefore,
accurate prediction of first period play is crucial for good performance at the aggregate level. fEWA can
incorporate the payoff game structure variables but not the other variables, which prevents high first period
accuracy. The full model is able to predict first period play well with a model trained only on first periods in
the training data, and then use a dynamic model trained on periods > 1 in the training data, allowing for
subtly different relationships between game structures and the evolution of cooperation.
delta*infinity
infinity
risk
error
r1
r1*delta
r2
r2*delta
continuous
delta
error*other decision lag1
time period
other decision lag1
my decision lag1
0 25 50 75 100
Relative Variable Importance
Va
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Fig. 7. Variable importance scores for individual-level dynamic component of full model, i.e. for predictions
of an agents’ probability of cooperation in periods > 1. Variables separated by ‘*’ represent an interaction
between those two variables. These relative importance scores are derived from the absolute values of the
t-statistics for each model parameter, which correspond to the effects of the predictor variables (accounting
for variability in the estimates) on the probability of cooperation, ceteris paribus [19].
The empirical experiments varied structural game parameters to measure hypothesized differences in cooper-
ation levels between structures. As a final validation, we compared the (out-of-sample) predicted average
cooperation levels between our synthetic model of behavior to the actual observed behavior in experiments
[7,8,10–13]. Overall, our model came to the same qualitative conclusions as the experiments: δ, infinity and
particular payoff configurations increased cooperation, while risk reduced cooperation. We detail each paper’s
finding and illustrate our model’s corresponding finding graphically in Fig. 8.
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Fig. 8. Predicted proportions of cooperation (n = 28 ). We could not include more than one game structure
from two papers (game structures 3 and 18) that comprised our integrated data set [6,9], because they were
comparing either to one-shot games or games with artificial opponents. Therefore, in our model’s replication
of the qualitative empirical experimental findings, we could not conduct any replication related to these two
papers’ findings. Dal Bo and Frechette found that: delta increases cooperation, keeping payoffs fixed (A.);
and that certain payoffs increase cooperation, while fixing delta (B.). Bereby-Meyer and Roth found that
risk reduces cooperation, where payoffs were framed as gains (C.). Kunreuther et al. found that risk reduces
cooperation, with payoffs framed as losses rather than gains (D.). This is the only finding where we predicted
marginally different cooperation levels when the empirical data indicates a larger gap. Fudenberg Rand and
Dreber found that certain payoffs increase cooperation (E.). Friedman and Oprea found that certain payoffs
increase cooperation (F.). Dal Bo found that delta increases cooperation, fixing payoffs and infinity (G.);
having an ‘infinitely’ repeated game increases cooperation, fixing payoffs and delta (G.); and certain payoffs
increase cooperation, fixing infinity and delta (H.). Dal Bo also found that the cooperation levels decrease
more over time within finite games (Fig. 6 Structures 23 - 26), compared to infinite games (Fig. 6 Structures
27 - 30).
Analysis
After re-learning the computational model with all available data to best explore the full parameter space, we
deployed it to quantify the sensitivity of cooperation to each of the structural game design parameters. To
systematically explore the model, we generated thousands of collections of input values (specifications of
Prisoner’s Dilemma experiments) from the multi-dimensional distribution covering the feasible ranges of all
input values using Latin Hypercube sampling [43,44]. The variables are drawn from the following distributions,
with the constraint that r1 < r2 because r1 is always less than r2 in the data: error ∼ Unif(0, 0.5);
δ ∼ Unif(0.45, 0.95); infinity ∼ Bern(0.5); risk ∼ Bern(0.5); r1 ∼ Unif(0, 1); r2 ∼ Unif(0, 1). Then we
simulated cooperation dynamics for each experimental input set. This global sampling and simulation allows
subsequent analysis to generate reliable information about the relationships between model inputs (structural
game design parameters) and output (cooperation behavior) [45,46].
Based on the results of a partial rank correlation coefficient analysis [45,47], the six main game structure
variables can be divided into three groups that contain two variables each within the 95% confidence interval of
each other (Fig. 9A); we obtain qualitatively equivalent results with a standardized rank regression coefficient
analysis (see S1 Appendix). δ and r2 have very large positive effects on average cooperation levels. As noted
above and explained further in the S1 Appendix, our δ measure is applicable to both infinite and finite games
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as a measure of the expected length of the game from a first period perspective, and the dynamic model has
an interaction term between δ and infinity that allows the δ effect in periods greater than one to be different
for infinite games. Surprisingly, this interaction term is the least important predictor variable in the dynamic
model (Fig. 7), suggesting that the effect of the expected length of the game from a first period perspective
is independent of whether the game is indefinitely repeated.
Infinity and r1 have moderately large positive effects on cooperation. r1 is generally used as an index of the
cooperativeness of the payoff table so it is surprising that r2 has a significantly larger impact on cooperation.
Our analysis suggests that we can increase the probability of cooperation more by increasing the difference
between the potential outcomes of a player and her opponent both cooperating (C,C) and only her cooperating
(C,D). Increasing the difference between mutual cooperation (C,C) and mutual defection (D,D) will also
increase cooperation, but less. The third group includes error and risk, which have negative effects on
cooperation.
We empirically discovered that if a player cooperated (defected) in the previous period, she is very likely to
cooperate (defect) in the next (Fig. 7). To explore the implications of this finding, we modified our simulation
model so that we could exogenously set the probability of an agent cooperating in the first period, and found
that it strongly affects cooperation levels in subsequent periods with the game structure set to the empirical
mean values (Fig. 9B Simulated Experiments 1 and 4). However, a game structure that the analysis indicates
is very favorable to cooperation can moderate the negative effect of initial defection (Fig. 9B Experiment 2),
and, conversely, a game structure that the analysis suggests should inhibit cooperation can moderate the
positive effect of initial cooperation (Fig. 9B Experiment 3). The history of a particular interaction and the
institutional structure both play important roles in determining cooperation levels.
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Fig. 9. Model simulation analysis. A. is a partial rank correlation coefficient analysis [47] of the effects of
the game parameters on average cooperation; lines are bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals (n = 1,000 ).
Continuous is set to its empirical mode, 0, because we had no within experiment variation on this. B.
shows that first period play strongly affects cooperation levels in periods greater than one. Setting the game
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structure variables to the mean of the empirically observed values: if we exogenously set the probability of
cooperation during the first period to 0 the simulated proportion of cooperation in subsequent periods is
only 0.18 (‘simulated experiment 1’), and if we set the probability of cooperation during the first period to
1 the simulated proportion of cooperation in subsequent periods is 0.68 (‘simulated experiment 4’). When
the probability of first period cooperation is set to 0, and we use a game structure that A. suggests should
maximize cooperation, the proportion of cooperation is 0.43 (‘simulated experiment 2’); and when the
probability of first period cooperation is set to 1, with the game structure that should minimize cooperation,
the cooperation level is 0.35 (‘simulated experiment 3’).
We further investigated “inertia” – the probability a player will cooperate given that she cooperated last
period – and its relationship to game structure. We compute an average “predicted inertia” for each of the
thirty game structures by predicting the probability of cooperation after cooperating last period in a given
game structure with our model, marginalizing out the effect of the time period and the opponent’s previous
decision. To compute an average “actual inertia” value for each of the thirty game structures we divide the
sum of the number of times all players cooperated after cooperating in the previous period by the total
number of times all players cooperated in the previous period. The thirty predicted and actual inertia values
have a 0.74 correlation, further evidence that the model captures the relevant patterns in the data. Game
structures with longer expected length of interactions from a first-period perspective (higher δ), indefinite
repetition, and higher r2 payoff values have higher actual inertia values. δ is the strongest predictor of higher
inertia and they are correlated at the 0.71 level.
Conclusion
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is widely used to understand the tension between social and individual interests.
We develop a computational model that can accurately predict human behavior in Prisoner’s Dilemma
experimental games for a broad range of game structures, using only a few such structures for calibrating
the model. We demonstrate that our approach can successfully predict behavior at multiple scales, yielding
the most rigorously and broadly validated computational framework to date for designing institutions that
promote cooperation in social dilemma scenarios. In particular, we use our model to identify variables that
have the greatest impact on cooperation.
Our sensitivity analysis demonstrated the importance of higher expected values of interaction length and
larger differences between potential C,C and C,D outcomes (Fig. 9). It is more important to increase the
benefits of mutual cooperation over losing out by being the sole cooperator than it is to increase the potential
benefits of mutual cooperation relative to mutual defection. These insights are relevant to improving the
underlying structure of new policy programs and designing new human subjects experiments. This work
represents a new approach to understanding and predicting human interactions that will be increasingly
relevant as more (experimental and observational) behavioral data is collected. With sufficient behavioral
data from a variety of policy structures, our computational method can be applied to understand which
factors should be prioritized to improve policy outcomes. The specifics need to be tailored to the circumstance,
but models like ours can serve as a starting point for understanding which structural factors of a policy are
most influential.
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